1 §1. Even in an era of filigree-like academic specialization, the study of belief systems has not yet succeeded in winning recognition as an independent area of knowledge. Perhaps there is no need for it. After all, the undemarcated boundaries of our subject have been traversed again and again by raiding parties operating out of bases in history, theology, ethnography, biology, and literary criticism; and, when these razzias have sometimes been led by skirmishers of the calibre of Norman Cohn, Rudolf Otto, Gershom Scholem, Peter Worsley, and in our day Ronald Hutton, it is no surprise that the results have often proved brilliant. Much, then, is actually already known about belief systems, both in general and in particular, and the treasures of the discipline we are proposing to establish already adorn the museums of sundry other fields. As if that were not reason enough to look without enthusiasm on any unilateral declaration of independence, it must seem likely that a newly separate science of belief systems would at once start trying to reduce the flourishing and well-run disciplines of political science and religious studies to the status of tributary departments -and that it would further threaten to annex some of the richest provinces of psychology, sociology, and philosophy. On the face of it, the attempt to set up a science of belief systems is both superfluous and, potentially, disruptive.
. And yet belief systems are, on the whole, very imperfectly understood. Often they are not thought to be worth understanding at all. Countless millions of our fellow human beings believe in animal liberation, the face on Mars, Haredism, Hindutva, humanitarian intervention, the New Age, the new atheism, 9/11 Truth; and yet we are often content to assume that we believe our beliefs because they are true, while other people believe other things because other people are malicious, Introduction: The Idea of a Science of Belief Systems deceived, or mad, so there is really nothing to understand. People who were teenagers at the time of the first flying saucer craze (1947) are now in their eighties: in another decade or two, the chance to interview them about how they first heard of saucers, what they thought they were, and so forth will be gone, lost as irrecoverably as the chance to quiz the first generation that heard of angels. Something similar can be said of Albanians' experiences in the years after 1966, when delegates to that year's congress of the Party of Labour voted to abolish religion. Neither Stalin, nor Mao, nor Choibalsang ever attempted so much. A whole generation had time to reach adulthood in a society where they were as likely to attend an Orphic or Dionysian rite as they were a legal service in a church or a mosque. One may regard this policy as execrable and infamous, or as crudely Utopian, or even as a salutary measure of intellectual hygiene. But one cannot deny that it raises a wealth of fascinating and significant questions: the ways in which Catholics, Orthodox, and Muslims maintained their faith while public expression of it was illegal; attitudes among atheists; the responses of the children of the atheist state when religious preaching was legalized. Only the absence of a science of belief systems can explain the paucity of research into one of the twentieth century's most ambitious social experiments. The study of belief systems is so far from being a science, indeed, that the mere attempt to understand certain belief systems (racism, al-Qaeda) is sometimes labelled immoral in itself -reproaches that physicists, in recent centuries, have had to answer only when their pure research has led to potentially or actually dangerous technological applications. As a result, most of us know almost nothing about what other people believe, why they believe it, or how it feels to believe it. If these questions are to be answered, it seems we do after all need a science of belief systems: and, in view of the generalized methodological chaos that still prevails in this area, there may be some value in offering even a few simple reflections on how our field can move towards becoming an objective science. §3. The phrase 'belief systems' has already been used a few times, and will occur rather often in what follows, but it is not intended as a particular term of art. The reverse, if anything: I have chosen 'belief systems' precisely because it is more general and less theoretically loaded than the possible alternatives. Common usage draws a firm distinction between 'religious faith' and 'political ideology': to call Euroscepticism a 'faith', or Pentecostalism an 'ideology', would sound peculiar -and would probably cause unnecessary offence. We would anyway be ill advised to start from the assumptions, first, that 'religion' and 'politics' represent two
